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I. INTRODUCTION
Attorney Goodfellow arrives at the office with an air of worriment.
He is distraught. Having endured law school, passed the bar examina-
tion, received the blessing of the Committee on Character and Fitness,
and having practiced for fifteen years with an unblemished record, he
has received a complaint from the Board of Commissioners on Griev-
ances and Discipline. He now seeks my aid as counsel.
Calm down, Goodfellow. What is the nature of the complaint?
Among other things, it alleges that attorney Goodfellow has:
A. been a bad fellow;
B. engaged in contumacious conduct;
C. failed to conduct himself in an upright manner; and
D. engaged in conduct that violates the lore of the profession.
The complaint requests appropriate sanctions without specificity.
* Partner, Nexsen Pruet Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, South Carolina. A.B. 1963,
University of South Carolina; LL.B. 1965, University of South Carolina.
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Discipline could range from a private reprimand to outright
disbarment.
What does this mean, he asks. I respond, I do not know. What
have you done that warrants these charges? You must serve interroga-
tories and requests to produce, he insists. We will then take deposi-
tions of the witnesses and serve requests to admit. Sorry, Goodfellow,
no right to discovery exists in a disciplinary case. At this point, attor-
ney Goodfellow is visibly agitated. Well, what can we do, he asks.
Well, Goodfellow, you need to understand that because you are
well educated and trained as a lawyer, and because you are a part of
the system, you have fewer rights than ordinary people. Do you under-
stand that? No, he cries, this cannot be. The law treats everyone
equally. Patience, Goodfellow. Let me explain your rights. You have
the right not to remain silent. You are obligated to cooperate and to
give evidence against yourself. Everything you say can and will be used
against you. You do not have the right to an appointed lawyer, al-
though you have the right to counsel at your own expense. Now Good-
fellow begins to doubt his attorney. Wait a minute, he says, even petty
thieves in magistrate's court have greater rights. How about the right
to a jury trial? No, no right to a jury trial, and a standard of substan-
tially less than reasonable doubt will determine your guilt.
Do we at least have the right to a hearing? Yes, you have a right to
a hearing. The Board, which has investigated your case and filed the
charges, will provide a hearing panel. A prosecuting attorney assigned
by the Board will present the case. The panel will make a recommen-
dation to the Executive Committee of the Board, which, based on the
record, will make a recommendation to the supreme court. The su-
preme court, also relying on the record, will then make independent
findings and decide the case.
Let me see if I understand the process. The Board has investigated
my case, has determined probable cause, will present the case through
its own prosecutor, and then will decide my case for purposes of sub-
mission to the supreme court? In other words, the court, through the
Board, acts as investigator, prosecutor, and judge, all rolled into one?
Yes, that is what I am telling you. Now I understand, he says. My only
real resort is to throw myself on the mercy of the court. Now you un-
derstand, I tell him, that is correct.
Is the system fair? Can attorney Goodfellow be tried on a charge
as nebulous as being a bad fellow? Are attorneys less than equal in a
system that constitutionally guarantees equality for all? In protecting
his license to practice law and his good name and reputation, does at-
torney Goodfellow in fact and in law have fewer rights than an alleged
shoplifter in magistrate's court? Is it fair or right that the court, acting
through its agent and servant, the Board of Commissioners on Griev-
ances and Discipline, possesses and exercises all of the powers that are
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brought to bear in a disciplinary case? Consider for a moment that the
court makes all the rules. It determines who is admitted to practice. It
defines the standards of conduct. Through its agents it investigates,
prosecutes, judges, and disciplines attorneys. The court, subject only to
self-restraint and boundaries defined in the Constitution, has great lat-
itude in regulating lawyers.
No other profession, occupation, business, or calling is subject to
the singular control that the court exercises over attorneys. In other
matters, the legislative and executive branches, through statutes and
administrative regulations, govern conduct when necessary to protect
the public. The court typically decides cases according to standards
and objectives set by others. Investigations and prosecutions of
criminals generally are performed separately and independently by
agencies that enjoy a large degree of discretion. This is typical of the
checks and balances in our democratic system. This is not the case for
attorneys, however, and this concept must be understood in order to
evaluate due process in attorney disciplinary proceedings.
II. THE MEASURE OF DUE PROCESS IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
There is no right to practice law. It is a privilege given to a chosen
few who enjoy a monopoly. As Judge Cardozo noted, "membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."' Hence, the peculiar
difference in the regulation of lawyers' conduct is explained by the fact
that lawyers are a part of the judicial system. They are the administra-
tors of the system, officers of the court, and stand in a fiduciary rela-
tionship to the court and the system of justice. In addition, courts have
acknowledged that because the practice of law should benefit the pub-
lic, disciplinary proceedings are brought not to punish attorneys, but to
protect courts and the public from the official ministrations of attor-
neys unfit to practice.
2
Based on the relationship between lawyers, the public, and the ju-
dicial system, early English courts determined that courts possess in-
nate powers to regulate and discipline lawyers as part of the process of
protecting "a profession which should stand free from all suspicion."'
1. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917).
2. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1353 (7th Cir.
1972); In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1970); Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp.
930, 933 (E.D. Ky. 1947), rev'd, 166 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1948). South Carolina recognizes
the tenet that disciplinary power should be used to protect the profession and the public
rather than to punish the lawyer. See, e.g., In re Galloway, 278 S.C. 615, 300 S.E.2d 479
(1983); In re Burr, 267 S.C. 419, 228 S.E.2d 678 (1976); In re Kennedy, 254 S.C. 463, 176
S.E.2d 125 (1970); State v. Jennings, 161 S.C. 263, 159 S.E. 627 (1931).
3. Ex parte Brownsell, 98 Eng. Rep. 1385 (K.B. 1778) (attorney branded on the
1991]
3
Brewer: Due Process in Lawyer Disciplinary Cases: From the Cradle to the
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall expressed the same concept in the
United States: "Some controlling power, some discretion, ought to re-
side in the Court. This discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised . . . . 4 Later, in
Ex parte Secombe,5 the Court reflected:
The power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exer-
cised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or per-
sonal hostility; but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate
it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and inde-
pendence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained
by the court, as the rights and dignity of the court itself.8
The privilege of practicing law cannot be removed lightly or capri-
ciously.7 Attorneys "can only be deprived of [their office] for miscon-
duct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after op-
portunity to be heard has been afforded." 8 Clearly, then, the inherent
authority of courts to discipline lawyers carries with it the necessity
that this authority is administered according to the principles of due
process.
The combination of two factors has sparked a great deal of debate
in the cases and among commentators about the application of due
process principles to disciplinary actions." First, the purpose of disci-
plinary proceedings is to protect the public and the legal profession
rather than to punish the lawyer, and second, due process is an elusive
and fluid concept.
Some believe that the injury which disciplinary action can inflict
on a lawyer is such that due process principles developed in criminal
cases should apply. Others believe that the proceedings are civil and
are thus governed by rules of civil procedure. Still others believe that
disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal but rather have a
distinct nature of their own.10 Proponents of the last view argue that
hand and disbarred for stealing a guinea).
4. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824).
5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856).
6. Id. at 13.
7. Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F.
Supp. 930, 933 (E.D. Ky. 1947), rev'd, 166 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1948).
8. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
9. Aprile, An Overview of Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings in New Jersey: Is the
System Fair to the Accused?, 18 SuroN HALL L. REV. 554 (1988); Gressman, Inherent
Judicial Power and Disciplinary Due Process, 18 SETON HALL L. REv. 539 (1988);
Nordby, The Burdened Privilege: Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings, 30
S.C.L. REv. 363 (1979).
10. See In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970); [Manual] Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 101:2101-04 (1984). Conceptually, South Carolina is in this cate-
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because the primary purpose of the court's disciplinary power is not to
punish, the proceedings do not need to include all of the elaborate
safeguards found in criminal proceedings. This rationale is sound. The
distinction between disciplinary actions and criminal proceedings is
valid because an attorney may be disciplined for acts or omissions that
are not criminal, or for conduct that may not involve fault, such as
mental infirmity or some other disability."
In In re Ruffao 12 the United States Supreme Court considered the
measure of due process to which an attorney should be entitled in a
disciplinary proceeding. In Ruffalo an attorney was charged with
twelve allegations of misconduct in his handling of claims against rail-
roads under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Ohio Board of
Commissioners on Grievance and Discipline used his testimony regard-
ing those allegations to bring a thirteenth charge. The Ohio Supreme
Court later disbarred the attorney based on that final allegation. The
Supreme Court noted that the procedure used by the grievance board
would never pass muster in any civil or criminal litigation.13 The Court
characterized disciplinary hearings as "adversary proceedings of a
quasi-criminal nature"' 4 that require the grievance board, pursuant to
procedural due process, to inform a respondent of charges against him
before the proceedings commence. Otherwise, proceedings are a trap to
respondents who are unable to expunge earlier incriminating
testimony.1 5
Ruffalo left some doubt about the extent to which due process in
disciplinary actions matches the standards of criminal law. Later cases,
both state and federal, have construed Ruffalo as not requiring "the
full panoply of rights afforded to an accused in a criminal case.""' The
gory. Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
11. See, e.g., In re Alexander, 301 S.C. 212, 391 S.E.2d 254 (1990) (reprimand for
neglect); In re Palmer, 298 S.C. 324, 380 S.E.2d 813 (1989) (suspension for neglect and
failure to cooperate with the grievance board); In re Goude, 296 S.C. 510, 374 S.E.2d 496
(1988) (reprimand for public outburst and shouting following a trial); In re Howle, 294
S.C. 244, 363 S.E.2d 693 (1988) (suspension for actions traceable to a manic depressive
episode); In re McDow, 291 S.C. 468, 354 S.E.2d 383 (1987) (reprimand for an adulterous
relationship with a client); In re Rushton, 286 S.C. 543, 335 S.E.2d 238 (1985) (suspen-
sion for intoxication in the presence of clients).
12. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
13. Id. at 551 (quoting In re Ruffalo, 370 F.2d 447, 462 (6th Cir. 1966) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting
People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985); see
also In re Evans, 834 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1987); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Dur-
ham, 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); Missis-
sippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So. 2d 210 (Miss. 1987).
1991]
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question is, therefore, what elements of due process must be incorpo-
rated into a disciplinary proceeding to ensure the respondent a fair
hearing.
17
III. THE ATTORNEY'S RIGHTS IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
A. The Right to a Hearing Before an Adjudicating Court
In Mildner v. Gulotta'2 a three judge panel reviewed the constitu-
tionality of New York's disciplinary procedures. The majority noted
that the state has wide latitude to establish and apply standards and
procedures to regulate professional conduct.19
The Mildner action combined three cases in a single trial before a
referee who reported his findings to the appellate division. This general
procedural practice required the appellate division to issue an opinion
based on the record compiled by the court below. 20 The referee made
findings about the credibility of certain witnesses. The court rejected
those findings without explanation. The respondents in the discipli-
nary actions argued that the court's repudiation of the referee's find-
ings denied them a fair hearing because only the referee had taken into
account the demeanor of the witnesses. The respondents also argued
that the procedure violated their due process rights because they had
no right to oral argument before the court.
2'
The majority recognized that disciplinary hearings are judicial, not
administrative, in nature,22 but rejected the notion that disciplinary
proceedings are either criminal or civil. Rather, the court noted that
disciplinary proceedings are investigative.23 Thus, the importance of
witness credibility diminishes when the conduct of the attorney him-
self is the court's true inquiry. The court further noted that use of
referees is well established, and rejected outright the assertion that
17. A right to a fair hearing is elementary and not unique to disciplinary cases. See,
e.g., Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 301 S.C. 326, 391 S.E.2d 866 (1990).
Moreover, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the civil concepts of default
and waiver apply to disciplinary actions. In re Davis, 279 S.C. 532, 309 S.E.2d 5 (1983)
(default by reason of failure to answer); S.C. App. CT. R. 413(27), (28) (allowing disbar-
ment and discipline by consent).
18. 405 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
19. Id. at 192.
20. Id. at 188-89 n.4.
21. Id. at 194. The respondents also alleged they were denied due process because
they had no right to appeal. The court decided that if denial of appellate review does not
offend due process in criminal cases, clearly denial does not offend due process in cases
of less than a criminal nature. Id. at 195.
22. Id. at 191.
23. Id. at 191-92 (quoting In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1353 (7th Cir. 1972)).
[Vol. 42
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oral argument should be allowed in disbarment proceedings. Thus, the
court concluded that the respondents had not been denied a funda-
mentally fair hearing.24
South Carolina, like most states, follows a procedure similar to
that in Mildner in which the deciding court does not actually hear the
testimony, but reserves to itself the final decision-making authority.
25
The South Carolina Supreme Court has affirmed that it alone has the
power to regulate and discipline attorneys.2" On a number of occasions,
the court has imposed sanctions different from those recommended by
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (Board).
27
Nevertheless, the court gives great weight to the recommendations of
the Board.
28
B. The Right to Separate Legal Functions Within Disciplinary
Proceedings
Many courts have held that the combination of investigative,
prosecutorial, and judicial functions in one entity, without more, does
not violate due process.29 However, the ABA has recognized the poten-
tial for collusion. The Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforce-
ment (Enforcement Rules)30 provide that the prosecutorial and adjudi-
24. Id. at 194. Judge Weinstein, in an extended dissent, however, examined the con-
cept of due process in disciplinary cases and concluded that the procedures did not pass
constitutional muster. Judge Weinstein's arguments viewed the due process require-
ments in a context more closely akin to criminal procedure, but he also pointed out the
potential for a court's abuse of its inherent and plenary power when the rules are not
well defined. Id. at 201-29.
25. See, e.g., Czura v. Supreme Court, 632 F. Supp. 267 (D.S.C. 1986), afi'd, 813
F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1987).
26. In re Rushton, 286 S.C. 543, 335 S.E.2d 238 (1985); Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C.
316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
27. See In re Rowland, 293 S.C. 17, 358 S.E.2d 387 (1987); In re Gaines, 293 S.C.
314, 360 S.E.2d 313 (1987); In re King, 279 S.C. 48, 301 S.E.2d 752 (1983); In re Brooks,
274 S.C. 601, 267 S.E.2d 74, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984 (1980).
28. See supra note 27.
29. In re Crooks, 51 Cal. 3d 1090, 800 P.2d 898, 275 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1990); In re
Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1976); In re Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473, ap-
peal dismissed sub nom. White v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 488 U.S. 805 (1988);
In re Beattie, 275 S.C. 305, 270 S.E.2d 624 (1980) (the court rejected summarily the
argument that it was unconstitutional for the executive committee to make different
findings from the hearing panel); In re Lynch, 114 Wash. 2d 598, 789 P.2d 752 (1990).
See also In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961) (attorney deprived of due
process when functions of prosecutor, judge, and jury were combined and charges were
adjudicated without hearing of witnesses).
30. Promulgated by the American Bar Association, the ABA first adopted the En-
forcement Rules in 1979 and subsequently revised the rules several times. The ABA
adopted the current version in August 1989.
1991]
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cative functions "shall be separated within the agency insofar as
practicable in order to avoid unfairness. ' 31 Under the Enforcement
Rules, the prosecutorial function is performed by an attorney em-
ployed by the disciplinary board. The prosecuting attorney has sub-
stantial discretion to determine whether to prosecute under formal
charges or to recommend action other than prosecution. 2
The Enforcement Rules are similar in many respects to the South
Carolina Disciplinary Procedure.3 3 Both regulations involve different
people in the investigative and adjudicative process by providing that
persons who have investigated a matter shall not sit on the hearing
panel.34 South Carolina's Disciplinary Procedure also requires that the
Office of the Attorney General must provide the prosecuting attorney.
3 5
However, the Disciplinary Procedure does not vest the Attorney Gen-
eral with any of the discretionary authority historically accorded to
prosecutors. In practice, prosecutors believe they act as investigators
and trial attorneys. The delegation of duties to the Attorney General,
therefore, does little to avoid the potential inequity of a unitary
system.
C. The Right to an Impartial Tribunal
Disciplinary hearings have evolved from summary dispositions
3
into proceedings that more closely resemble modern civil trials regu-
lated by rules borrowed from criminal process. 37 However, the right to
a fair hearing in a disciplinary proceeding does not include the right to
a jury trial.38 Opponents of this rule criticize it because they believe a
lay jury would give respondents a fairer trial on professional compe-
tence questions than a hearing panel composed of the respondent's
31. MODEL RuLEs FOR LAW. DIsCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 2 (1989).
32. Id.
33. S.C. App. CT. R. 413.
34. Id. 413(12)(F).
35. Id. 413(12)(D).
36. See, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
37. In South Carolina, for example, the disciplinary procedure provides that the
Board should dispose of disciplinary actions in a reasonably expeditious manner, and
that nonprejudicial irregularities will not invalidate any proceeding. S.C. App. CT. R.
413(24)(A), (C) (the rule should be liberally construed to protect the public, courts, and
legal profession). Amendment to pleadings or other documents is allowed at any time
prior to the final order of the South Carolina Supreme Court. The right to a fair hearing
also generally includes the right, at some stage, to confrontation and cross-examination
of witnesses, although, as noted earlier, the ultimate decision maker need not view the
witnesses or hear the evidence firsthand. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
38. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
[Vol. 42
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peers and a court comprised of judges who also are lawyers.3 9 In con-
trast, proponents of the rule argue with equal force that justice is
served better in a trial before lawyers who appreciate the issues con-
cerning professional competence and adherence to standards. In any
event, attorneys facing disciplinary actions have a right to an impartial
tribunal. 0 South Carolina's Disciplinary Procedure provides that
Board members may be disqualified on the same bases as other simi-
larly-situated members of the judiciary.
41
The Enforcement Rules and South Carolina's Disciplinary Proce-
dure both provide for the appointment of public, or nonlawyer, mem-
bers. 42 The notion of including lay persons in the disciplinary process
reflects populist thinking that the public at large should assist in the
regulation of lawyers in order to increase confidence in the system and
temper elitism that may result from self-policing. Moreover, one of the
weaknesses of the traditional disciplinary system has been that the ple-
nary power assumed by the courts receives judicial restraint. From the
respondent's standpoint, the presence of the nonlawyers in the process
may enhance judicial restraint. As "outsiders," lay persons need not
defer to the court in the same manner that is expected from members
of the bar. Furthermore, the addition of lay persons to the process bol-
sters public confidence and grants the respondent the best of jury and
nonjury review. The legal profession also benefits when the practical
and unfettered view of the lay person is combined with the expertise of
attorneys to review possible misconduct.
D. The Right to Discovery
Lawyers subject to disciplinary action have a general right to pre-
sent exculpatory evidence.4 3 They also may have a right to disclosure.
4
4
The right of discovery is subject to continued debate, however, espe-
cially among those who have been involved in the disciplinary process.
Those who insist on the need for discovery assert that the safeguards
of criminal procedure should apply. Nevertheless, a lawyer has no right
to discovery in disciplinary proceedings, at least not as that term is
39. See Nordby, supra note 9.
40. Clarey v. Mathews, 224 Ga. 82, 160 S.E.2d 338 (1968); In re Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d
357, 140 N.E.2d 825 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 805 (1957).
41. S.C. App. CT. R. 413(3)(D).
42. MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 2(B), 3(A) (1989)
(board and hearing committee); S.C. App. CT. R. 413(4)(A)(3) (executive committee).
43. MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 11 (1989); S.C. App. CT.
R. 413(12).
44. See Nettervllle v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1981) (due pro-
cess requires that the accused be given names and addresses of adverse witnesses).
1991]
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understood in criminal actions.
The right of discovery has been widely abused in civil litigation.
4 5
Therefore, courts are understandably reluctant to extend to discipli-
nary actions discovery methods which can be used not only to cause
delay and confusion but also to intimidate aggrieved persons involved
in the process. Nevertheless, although no general right to discovery ex-
ists, a court may order discovery pursuant to its supervisory power or
court rules, or legislatures may allow discovery by statute.4
The Enforcement Rules provide for limited discovery, including
depositions and disclosure pursuant to requests. Full discovery is not
allowed, but the Enforcement Rules allow depositions.47 Under South
Carolina's Disciplinary Procedure, a party must show good cause to ob-
tain discovery.4 8
The Attorney General of South Carolina typically volunteers to
exchange information, such as witness lists and documents, before
trial. However, the Attorney General could suspend this practice at
any time for any reason, which makes it an unacceptable substitute for
an adequate disclosure rule.
An informal procedure that minimally conforms to due process is
not as desirable as an express discovery procedure. Fairness requires
disclosure of at least the names and addresses of witnesses and the
existence of documents upon which the prosecution is based. Although
the failure to divulge these facts might pass constitutional muster
when the basis of the complaint is well known to the respondent, lack
of disclosure materially impairs the preparation of the defense in other
cases. In South Carolina, a dilemma arises: If the respondent is not
aware of the evidence, how can he show good cause to discover it?
E. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
The scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is limited to disclosures made in any proceeding, criminal, civil,
or other, that could be used to support criminal prosecution or estab-
lish a link in a chain of evidence leading to other evidence useable in a
45. MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 15 commentary (1989).
46. See Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962)
(Discovery Act applicable to disciplinary proceedings); Committee on Professional Ethics
& Conduct v. Hurd, 375 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1985) (court rules incorporate civil procedure
regarding discovery); Mississippi State Bar v. Attorney L, 511 So. 2d 119 (Miss. 1987)
(rules of civil procedure regarding discovery available because proceedings not totally
criminal in nature); Lashkowitz v. Disciplinary Bd., 410 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1987) (discov-
ery authorized for cause pursuant to supreme court's supervisory power).
47. MODEL RULES OF LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 15 (1989).
48. S.C. Ape. CT. R. 413(23)(D).
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criminal prosecution.49 In Spevak v. Klein" the United States Su-
preme Court held that a lawyer in a disciplinary case could neither be
forced to choose between his Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination and disbarment, nor be disbarred solely because he refused
to testify in a disciplinary proceeding. If the conduct involved is not
criminal, however, and would not lead to criminal prosecution, then
Spevak does not apply. In that situation, a court can compel an attor-
ney to produce self-incriminating evidence.5 Thus, when the Fifth
Amendment does not apply, a lawyer has an obligation to respond and
cooperate.5 2 A number of South Carolina cases have held that a law-
yer's failure to cooperate is an aggravating factor to be taken into
consideration.
5 3
Testimony given in a prior investigation under a grant of immu-
nity from criminal prosecution also may be admissible. 54 Furthermore,
if the attorney is granted immunity from later criminal proceedings,
the court can compel him to testify.55 Thus, the right against self-in-
crimination does not protect a respondent who has waived the right in
exchange for immunity in separate litigation.
F. The Right to Notice
Disciplinary cases often give rise to the issue of proper notice. The
49. United States v. Sharp, 920 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343
(1st Cir. 1985).
50. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
51. Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 231 N.E.2d 718, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968); Frank, The Myth of Spevak v. Klein, 54 ABA J. 970,
974 (1968). A great deal of litigation has resulted from Spevak involving other occupa-
tions that offer guidance in attorneys' cases. See, e.g., Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 598
F. Supp. 1456 (M.D. Ga. 1984) (police and fire fighters), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 782 F.2d 180 (11th Cir. 1986); Arthurs v.
Stern, 427 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 560 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1034 (1978) (physician); Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428 (D. Md. 1976) (engi-
neers), affd sub nom. Childs v. Schlitz, 556 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1977); McLean v. Roch-
ford, 404 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (police); State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Es-
tate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973) (real estate broker).
52. See [Manual] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 101:2401-04 (1984).
53. See, e.g., In re Blackmon, 295 S.C. 333, 368 S.E.2d 465 (1988); In re Bruner, 283
S.C. 114, 321 S.E.2d 600 (1984).
54. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 476-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); In
re Epstein, 37 A.D.2d 333, 325 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972);
see also Annotation, Extent and Determination of Attorney's Right or Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in Disbarment or Other Disciplinary Proceedings-Post Spevak
Cases, 30 A.LR.4TH 243, 263 (1984); Annotation, Use in Disbarment Proceedings of Tes-
timony Given by Attorney in Criminal Proceedings Under Grant of Immunity, 62
A.L.R.3D 1145 (1975).
55. In re March, 71 IlM. 2d 382, 399, 376 N.E.2d 213, 220 (1978).
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problem is not merely one of sufficiency of the complaint, but arises in
large part from the vagueness of the standards of the profession. For
instance, to engage in actions that prejudice the administration of jus-
tice violates the Rules of Professional Conduct."6 What does this
mean? The hypothetical case at the beginning of this Article about the
attorney being charged as a bad fellow is not that much of an
exaggeration.
In Burns v. Clayton57 the South Carolina Supreme Court ad-
dressed the problem of characterizing misconduct. The respondents al-
legedly paid an accomplice to procure false statements from prospec-
tive witnesses. The complaint characterized their activities as
conspiracy but the Board's report erroneously defined the respondents'
actions as subornation of perjury.58 The South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a
formality of allegation, as in an indictment, is not required in pro-
ceedings such as the present. All that is required to their validity is
that respondent be clearly apprised of the charges, i.e., the facts upon
which the claim of misconduct is founded, and that he be afforded
reasonable opportunity for explanation and defense.50
The court's statement implies that due process is not offended as long
as reasonable attorneys could infer misconduct from the allegations of
the complaint.
In In re Ruffalo6" Justice White implied that legal professional
standards are self-evident. He asserted that members of the bar should
know that conduct that all responsible attorneys recognize as improper
for members of the profession is undesirable.6 ' Thus, a general charge
of fraud and dishonesty, with supporting factual allegations, is suffi-
cient, because responsible attorneys undeniably condemn such acts.
When responsible attorneys differ about the impropriety of certain
acts, however, prior notice is a prerequisite to disbarment.
6 2
Courts are not able to fashion many rules regarding prohibited
conduct. Often the facts of each case must be measured against max-
ims of professional responsibility found in the law and in moral tenets
56. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONA CoNDucT Rule 8.4(d)(1983) (adopted in South
Carolina effective September 1, 1990).
57. 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
58. Id. at 332, 117 S.E.2d at 308.
59. Id. at 333, 117 S.E.2d at 308.
60. 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 555. See, e.g., Klein v. Peterson, 866 F.2d 412 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1091 (1989) (misrepresenting date of patent filing); Florida Bar v. Abrams, 402 So.
2d 1150 (Fla. 1981) (deceiving government witness); Committee on Professional Ethics
and Conduct v. Hurd, 325 N.W.2d 386 (Iowa 1982) (alteration of venue motion).
62. Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 556.
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governing society in general and attorneys in particular. For example,
in Committee on Professional Ethics v. Durham'3 the Iowa Supreme
Court held that although due process applies, courts hearing discipli-
nary matters use a vagueness criterion less stringent than that em-
ployed in criminal cases. The court noted that guidelines for members
of the bar cannot and need not match the clarity required of rules of
conduct for the accused in a criminal case because of a lawyer's spe-
cialized training. 4 Moreover, it "would be virtually impossible to de-
velop a set of rules to specifically cover all professional activity which
could merit discipline, thus necessitating broader standards."6 5 The
Durham court imposed a higher standard of care on attorneys based
on the "unique and learned nature of the profession."6
In Durham the court examined the constitutionality of standards
such as failing to behave in a "temperate and dignified"6 7 manner, en-
gaging in conduct that creates the appearance of impropriety, and en-
gaging in conduct that reflects adversely on the attorney's ability to
practice. These vague standards are sufficiently distinct when mea-
sured against specific conduct, such as sexual contact with a client in a
professional context .
6
In In re Bithoney9 the attorney was charged with violating his
oath as a member of the bar because he did not "'demean [him]self
. . . uprightly and according to law.' ,,7o In addition, he was charged
with conduct "unbecoming a member of the Bar of the Court."7' The
respondent challenged these allegations as unconstitutionally vague.
7 2
The court noted that in the abstract this was a colorable argument.
63. 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979).
64. Id. at 284. South Carolina approved this reasoning in Toussaint v. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, - S.C. -, 400 S.E.2d 488 (1991). The respondent physician in
Toussaint contended that an unacceptably vague standard of misconduct set forth in
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-200 (Law. Co-op. 1976) violated his due process rights. The court
noted that "[w]hen persons affected by the law constitute a select group with a special-
ized understanding of the subject being regulated, the degree of definiteness required to
satisfy due process is measured by the common understanding and knowledge of the
group." Toussaint, - S.C. at -, 400 S.E.2d at 491. See also Zaman v. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, - S.C. _, 408 S.E.2d 213 (1991); Burdge v. State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, - S.C. -, 403 S.E.2d 114 (1991).
65. Durham, 279 N.W.2d at 284; Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 336, 117 S.E.2d
300, 310 (1960) (quoting Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723, 726 (1952), aff'd sub
noma. Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (1953)).
66. Durham, 279 N.W.2d at 284.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 284-85.
69. 486 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1973).
70. Id. at 321 (quoting FED. R App. P. 46(a)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 322.
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However, when placed in context with the respondent's specific con-
duct, filing and then abandoning frivolous multiple appeals, the terms
"[took] on definiteness and clarity.173 The court stated: "Under these
circumstances a member of the bar, like respondent, cannot complain
that there is not at least a core area of clearly prohibited conduct
which the words 'uprightly and according to law' and 'conduct un-
becoming to a member of the bar' mean to him."74
In In re Snyder7 5 an attorney was charged with contempt and re-
bellious conduct because of a letter he wrote to the court. The letter
expressed his disgust with the handling of a claim for attorneys' fees
under the Criminal Justice Act and asked the court to remove his
name from the list of appointed attorneys. After verbally jousting with
the chief judge of the circuit court, the respondent was suspended for
refusing to apologize.7 6 The United States Supreme Court held that
under the circumstances a single incident of rudeness was not sufficient
to warrant suspension.7 With this ruling, the Court avoided the issue
of whether a charge of "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar
78
satisfies constitutional due process. Rather, the court offered the "lore
of the profession" as a guide to define vague charges:
Read in light of the traditional duties imposed on an attorney, it is
clear that 'conduct unbecoming a member of the bar' is conduct con-
trary to professional standards that shows an unfitness to discharge
continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to
the administration of justice. More specific guidance is provided by
case law, applicable court rules, and 'the lore of the profession' as em-
bodied in codes of professional conduct.79
In re Finkelstein ° exemplifies the difficulty of applying the prin-
ciples expressed in Durham, Bithoney, and Snyder. In Finkelstein a
plaintiff's attorney in a civil rights case wrote a letter directly to the
defendant's general counsel and bypassed the defendant's retained
trial counsel. The letter discussed settlement, attorneys' fees, and ra-
cial issues. The district court found that the letter was an improper
communication with a client. More importantly, the court found that
the letter contained representations and overt threats that interjected
pressure group politics that amounted to extortion and disruption into
73. Id. at 324.
74. Id.
75. 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
76. Id. at 645.
77. Id. at 647.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 645.
80. 901 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1990).
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* the judicial process. The district court relied on Snyder to suspend the
attorney.8 1
The court of appeals reversed because it felt that the lower court
should not have suspended the lawyer simply because the letter im-
properly introduced politics into the settlement process.82 The court
commented that the lower court relied on a "transcendental code of
conduct [which] existed only in the subjective opinion of the court
.. '.."88 The court of appeals determined that the attorney's acts did
not involve clearly proscribed behavior and that responsible attorneys
could, and indeed did, differ about the propriety of the conduct. Thus,
Finkelstein could not have been on notice that the court would con-
demn his conduct.84
The problem of an unclear pleading often can be resolved by a
motion to make more definite and certain.8 5 When the issue is whether
the conduct is actually proscribed by the standard, however, substan-
tive issues are raised that only a judicial decision can answer.
When the South Carolina Supreme Court encounters the question
of whether an ethical standard actually proscribes particular conduct,
on occasion it has avoided the issue by simply mitigating punishment.
The court has issued a warning8s or an anonymous opinion8 7 to inform
the bar of conduct that will be subject to discipline in the future. Be-
cause the objective of attorney disciplinary actions is not to punish but
to protect the public and the system, this procedure is a commendable
effort to define the undefinable.
G. The Right to Confidentiality
Most states provide for some type of confidentiality."8 Most disci-
plinary cases result in private reprimands. Some actions simply are dis-
missed. Courts generally do not issue opinions for private reprimands
and dismissals. Consequently, it is difficult to research grievance mat-
ters or to make a judgment about possible sanctions. The disciplinary
81. Id. at 1563.
82. Id. The court also noted that hostility between opposing trial lawyers motivated
the respondent to initiate direct contact with general counsel. Id.
83. Id. at 1565.
84. Id.
85. See In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 265, 233 S.E.2d 301, 304 (1977), rev'd sub noma. In
re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
86. In re Bloom, 265 S.C. 86, 217 S.E.2d 143 (1975).
87. See, e.g., In re Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar, 297 S.C. 527, 377
S.E.2d 572 (1989); In re Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar, 297 S.C. 517,
377 S.E.2d 567 (1989).
88. MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 16 (1989); S.C. APP. CT.
R. 413(20).
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board and the court are aware of these cases, which puts the respon-
dent at a definite disadvantage. Writers on the subject have argued
that procedural fairness requires that all such opinions should be re-
ported anonymously.89
A publication of all disciplinary opinions, including anonymous
opinions regarding private reprimands and dismissals, not only would
serve as precedential guidance, but would also instill confidence in a
system of inherent court powers by opening the system to public scru-
tiny. Public examination encourages the necessary judicial self-re-
straint and ensures that the system operates fairly."'
H. Other Considerations
The concept of collateral estoppel often is employed in discipli-
nary cases. When an attorney has been convicted of a crime that is also
the subject of a disciplinary charge, he generally is precluded from re-
litigating the criminal charge, although there may be a right to a hear-
ing concerning the effect of the conviction upon the disciplinary pro-
cess.01 On the other hand, the acquittal of an attorney on a criminal
charge does not preclude prosecution of a disciplinary action, because a
disciplinary proceeding is noncriminal and the quantum of proof is
different.
92
Collateral estoppel also comes into play when the respondent has
been disbarred in one state and that proceeding is used as a basis for
disbarment in another state, or when the federal court is considering
the impact of a state court disciplinary order. Generally, the inquiry is
limited to whether the attorney had a fair hearing in the other forum.
9 3
In addition, collateral attack in federal court against state court pro-
ceedings in federal court is restricted by the abstention doctrine as well
as federal procedural rules.
9 4
89. Aprile, supra note 9, at 593-94; Nordby, supra note 9, at 363.
90. See supra text accompanying note 42.
91. S.C. App. CT. R. 413(6). See In re Warlick, 287 S.C. 380, 381, 339 S.E.2d 110, 111
(1985); In re Rish, 273 S.C. 365, 368, 256 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1979); see also Turco v.
Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); In re
Tedder, 296 S.C. 500, 374 S.E.2d 294 (1988).
92. Fitzsimmons v. State Bar, 34 Cal. 3d 327, 332, 667 P.2d 700, 703, 193 Cal. Rptr.
896, 899 (1983); see Cate v. Rivers, 246 S.C. 35, 142 S.E.2d 369 (1965) (return of no bill
to indictment does not preclude disbarment proceedings).
93. S.C. App. CT. R. 413(29)(D); see also In re Chipley, 448 F.2d 1234, 1235 (4th Cir.
1971); Czura v. Supreme Court, 632 F. Supp. 267, 270-71 (D.S.C. 1986), afl'd, 813 F.2d
644 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Reid, 540 A.2d 754, 757-58 (D.C. 1988); In re Witte, 99 Ill. 2d
301, 458 N.E.2d 484 (1983); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Dineen, 235 Neb.
363, 455 N.W.2d 178 (1990).
94. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982);
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Attorneys subject to disciplinary actions do not appear to have a
right to appointed counsel." Moreover, the burden of proof standard
varies according to the court's viewpoint of whether the proceedings
are civil or criminal or something else. The Enforcement Rules use a
standard of clear and convincing evidence 5 This is also the standard
in South Carolina.
9 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have a great deal of discretion and flexibility in managing
disciplinary matters. The potential for abuse and the need for judicial
restraint are manifest. Although courts have long recognized that at-
torneys have a right to fair treatment, the question of what is fair
treatment remains unanswered. The modern trend includes lay persons
in the disciplinary process to encourage judicial restraint and provide a
different perspective on possible misconduct.
The underlying goal of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the
public from unfit lawyers and maintain the integrity of the entire legal
system. Lawyers are not subjected to disciplinary proceedings in order
to be punished. Their licenses to practice cannot be withdrawn capri-
ciously. Thus, they are entitled to some measure of procedural due
process.
Current disciplinary procedures are constitutional. Nevertheless,
they could be reformed to ensure equity and justice. Rules that pro-
mote equity, such as those that deal with discovery, should be clarified
and enlarged. Publication of private or dismissed reprimand cases in
some anonymous form would inform the bar about condemned conduct
and would assure the public that these matters are being handled
properly. When possible, vague standards should be refined.
Due process is one of the most effective shields to protect attor-
neys from arbitrary reprisals in disciplinary actions. Such protection is
essential when courts have sole authority over lawyer's careers and
reputations.
Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Levin v.
Gulotta, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
95. In re Peters, 332 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1983); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence,
161 W. Va. 240, 240 S.E.2d 668 (1977).
96. MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 18(c)(1989).
97. In re Friday, 263 S.C. 156, 157, 208 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1974).
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